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ABSTRACT
THE ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF GOVERNMENTS AND 
PRODUCERS IN THE PRESENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Karaman, S. Cem
M.A., Department of Economics 
Administration
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Savaş Alpay
In my thesis I analyse the interactions between environmental regulations and 
international trade. I use a two-country, one-good, two-producer model. The 
governments may behave strategically in choosing their environmental policy 
and producers may behave strategically in choosing their R&D investment. 
Using a game theoretical approach, I try to identify the Nash equilibrium of the 
game. For identical countries, I consider two cases; simultaneous-move game 
and sequential-move game. I observe that the producers prefer not to act 
strategically for any action of governments. If one of the governments move in 
advance, it will prefer to act strategically. In a simultaneous-move game there 
is multiple equilibria and no conclusion can be made for the outcome of the 
game. For non-symmetric country case, I observe that the governments prefer 
to act strategically and the producers prefer not to act strategically where the 
game is a simultaneous-move game.
Keywords: environmental regulation, international trade, strategic behaviour
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ÖZET
ÇEVRE DÜZENLEMELERİNİN VE ULUSLARARASI TİCARETİN 
BULUNDUĞU ORTAMDA DEVLETLERİN VE ÜRETİCİLERİN 
DAVRANIŞLARININ İNCELENMESİ 
Karaman, S. Cem
Mastır, İktisat Bölümü
Tez Yönetieisi: Yrd. Doç. Savaş Alpay
Bu çalişmada, çevre düzenlemeleri ve uluslararası ticaret arasındaki ilişkiyi iki 
ülke, bir ürün, ve iki üreticinin olduğu bir modelde inceledim. Devletler, çevre 
düzenlemelerini seçerken stratejik davranıp davranmamayı, üreticiler de 
Ar&Ge yatırımlarini seçerken stratejik davranıp davranmamayı 
düşünmektedirler. Oyun teorisi kullanarak, bu oyunun Nash dengesini bulmaya 
çalıştım. Eş iki ülke için incelediğim iki durumdan birisi, eş zamanlı oyun, 
diğeri sıralı oyundur. Sonuçta üreticilerin, devletlerin politikaları ne olursa 
olsun stratejik davranmak istemediklerini tesbit ettim. Sıralı oyunda önce 
davranan devlet, stratejik davranmayı tercih edecektir. Eş zamanlı oyunda 
birden çok denge çıkmakta ve oyunun nasıl biteceği hakkında bir sonuca 
gidilememektedir. Simetrik olmayan eş zamanlı oyun için ise; devletlerin 
stratejik davranmayı, üreticilerin ise stratejik davranmamayı tercih edeceklerini 
tesbit ettim.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çevre Düzenlemeleri, Uluslararası Ticaret, Stratejik 
Davranış
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a great concern about the impacts of trade 
liberalization on environment. It is worried that trade-related goals may 
generate some distortions in environmental policies. The major concern is that 
freer trade will lead to laxer environmental standards in order to gain a 
competitive advantage over the trading partners. Imposition of homogeneous 
environmental regulations across countries is offered as a solution for this 
problem. One suggestion is that, if homogeneous environmental regulations are 
not achieved, those countries which use tougher environmental regulations than 
their rivals should be able to impose higher tariffs for the imports from 
countries with laxer environmental regulations. But imposition of higher tarrifs 
violate GATT agreement, thus may not be applicable. In brief the interaction 
between trade and environment is interesting and worthwhile to study. This 
relation between trade and environment attracted many of the economists’ 
attention.
The model first introduced by Brander and Spencer (1985), related to 
the analysis of export subsidies, is also used in many of the studies about eco­
dumping (eco-dumping refers to; relaxing environmental policies to give the 
domestic producer an advantage in international markets). In their model there 
is one domestic firm in domestic country and one foreign firm in foreign 
counuy and they produce identical products to be sold in a third market, there 
is no consumption in producing countiies. The behaviour of the firms is 
modelled as a Cournot duopoly. They use this model to analyse the role of 
export subsidies as an international trade policy, nevertheless their model is 
refered by many economists who study the relation between trade and 
environmental policy. In Brander and Spencer (1985), the governments in each 
countiy maximize the domestic surplus that is the profit of the domestic firm 
net of the subsidy where as in trade-environment studies the domestic surplus is 
the profit of the domestic firm net of the environmental damage.
At this stage let us mention some of the earlier studies which investigate 
the interaction between environment and trade. In his study, Kennedy (1994) 
tiies to find the optimum pollution tax in open economies. He argues that 
imperfect competition in global markets creates inefficient distortion of 
pollution taxes. He investigates two opposite effects that interact with each 
other, one to gain competitive advantage over the hading partner and the other 
to shift the pollution (together with production) to the other counhy. Then he 
shows that in case of perfect hansboundaiy pollution the second effect
vanishes. If the pollution is partially transboundaiy this distorts the pollution 
taxes that would otheiwise be globally efficient.
In a paper by Bairett (1994), another aspect of impeifectly competitive 
international markets is considered where governments impose weaker 
environmental standards on industries that are competing. He shows that if the 
domestic industry is a monopoly, the foreign industry is imperfectly 
competitive, and industrial competition is Cournot, then the domestic 
government has an incentive to set a weak environmental standard where weak 
means that the marginal cost of abatement is less than the marginal damage 
from pollution. Strategically optimal emission standards are set weaker than the 
environmentally optimal emission standar'ds.
Another discussion is whether strict environmental regulations will 
enhance domestic competitiveness or will harm domestic competitiveness. For 
example in the book of A1 Gore, “Earth in the Balance”, he argues that strict 
environmental regulations will promote innovation. It is expected that stringent 
regulations will be translated into long-run competitive advantage due to 
changes in cost of production as the result of the innovations. This theory is 
first developed by Porter and van der Linde (1995), the revisionist school 
argues that enviroirmental policy stringency (EPS) further improves the
competitiveness of domestic firms through triggered innovation. Their 
argument was severely criticized by Palmer et al. (1995). Porter and van der 
Linde (1995) suggested that, stricter environmental regulation forces the firms 
to innovate, and these firnis enjoy higher productivity and hence higher profits 
in the tong run. The criticism was based on the lacking evidence for the Porter 
hypothesis, where Porter and van der Linde (1995) have only provided case 
studies in support of their argument. Theoretically, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw 
(1999) show that, the trade-off between environmental conditions and profits of 
the home industry remains, but is less sharp because of the downsizing and 
modernization of the industry as a result of stricter environmental policy. In a 
paper by Simpson and Bradford (1996), they discuss this issue and ask under 
what conditions will more stringent environmental regulation actually increase 
the profitability of a domestic finn. They show that promoting innovation is a 
theoretical possibility, but they claim that it is extremely dubious as a practical 
advice. In their study, they use a three stage game in a two producer, one good 
model where the governments make a pollution tax decision in the first stage, 
in the second stage the finns decide how much to invest in R&D and in the 
final stage the producers decide how much to produce.
Another paper, which works on the relationship between trade and 
environment, is by Alpay (2000). He argues the two adverse externalities; the
negative externality due to transboundary pollution and the positive externality 
in the efforts to tackle the transboundary pollution. National environmental 
policies are subject to this positive externality and due to this positive 
externality countries leave it to others to take pro-environmental actions and 
this may result in too little pollution abatement. He shows that this pessimistic 
conclusion may be unwarranted in 2 x 2 Ricardian model. Moreover he 
demonstrates that the non-cooperative contribution of countries to global 
environmental protection exceeds that of the cooperative one due to associated 
changes in the terms of trade. Thus, international trade is shown to be affecting 
global environment positively in his model.
Ulph (1996), compares the usage of environmental pollution standards 
and pollution taxes for a pollution producing good in the presence of 
international trade. In the previous studies about trade and environment, only 
the government was given a strategic action. But the producers also have 
incentives to act strategically. They may act strategically by investing in 
capacity or R&D. This way they try to shift rents in their own favour. He 
studied the impact of strategic actions of the government and the producer on 
relaxing environmental policy. Basically in his model there are two countries 
that have one government and one producer in each of them. The governments 
and producers have the choice of acting strategically or not. There are three
stages of the model. In the first stage governments choose the emission level or 
pollution taxes by acting strategically or not. In the second stage the producers 
choose their R&D level by acting strategically or not. In the third stage the 
producers choose their output level. Governments act strategically by 
recognizing that the output of the rival firm depends on the emission level it 
sets. Producers act strategically by choosing the level of investment in R&D by 
considering the associated impact of the level of R&D on the rival firm. When 
they are not acting strategically they determine the R&D level by minimizing 
their own production cost plus R&D cost. The producers in each country 
compete in a third market or world market, so I isolate the disadvantages of 
imported goods, tariffs and consumer surplus considerations (consumption is 
excluded from utility of the country). The governments move first. He found 
that strategic behaviour by producers and governments is greater when 
governments use emission taxes than when they use emission standards and 
allowing governments to act strategically increases the incentive for producers 
to act strategically.
In this thesis, I adopt the model developed by Ulph (1996). Ulph studied 
the implications of strategic action of governments on the strategic action of 
producers and implications of strategic action of producers on the strategic 
action of governments. Also he compared the usage of taxes and standards
(setting the maximum emission level) as a policy. In my study I will not study 
taxes. Instead I will work with emission standards. In my study I will analyse 
the behaviour of governments and producers in detail. In particular I will try to 
find whether the government and/or the producer will choose to act in a 
strategic manner or not. So I setup a game theoretical model and try to identify 
the Nash equilibrium of this game. This is a three-stage-game model. As in 
Ulph, in the first stage governments choose the emission level by acting 
strategically or not. In the second stage the producers choose their R&D level 
by acting strategically or not. In the third stage the producers choose their 
output level. Ulph studied only the symmetric equilibria (both countries are 
applying the same strategy). Also the welfare implications of the policies are 
not considered in his work.
In this thesis, the symmetric and non-symmetric cases related to the 
behaviour of the governments and producers are studied. There are four 
possible outcomes when the governments of the two countries choose their 
actions. Then the two producers move by acting strategically or not. There are 
four possible outcomes for each outcome of the first step. So there are 16 
different possible cases. The strategic interaction between two countries’ 
governments and producers has welfare, output and emission consequences. I 
analyse the game first as simultaneous move game and then as a sequential
move game. In the simultaneous move game the governments in the first stage 
will choose their R&D level simultaneously. After the level of emission set by 
the governments is observed, the two producers in two countries will move 
simultaneously. In the sequential move game, I assume that the government in 
the domestic country will decide for its strategy first; then the second 
government chooses its strategy. After the governments’ choices, the producers 
choose their actions. I find the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
As a final analysis, I consider the non-symmetric country case, where 
one country is assumed to be a developed country and the other country is a 
developing country. It is usually seen that people in developed countries care 
for the environment much more than the people in developing countries. In this 
part I will assume that environmental damage will be given more weight in the 
developed country than the developing country. Thus I assume that the 
environmental damage parameter in developed country is more than the 
environmental damage parameter in the developing country. Under this setup I 
have found that:
If we consider the game as a simultaneous-move game the actions of the 
governments and producers cannot be predicted in advance. The game may
result even in the worst case where the welfare is lowest and the emissions are 
the highest.
If we consider the game as a sequential-move game the government who 
is moving first will prefer to act strategically and the rival country’s 
government will prefer not to act strategically. Moving first is an advantage for 
the welfare of the country.
The strategic action of producers is only effective when the other 
producer is acting strategically.
Producers prefer not to act strategically for any strategy of governments. 
This means that there is no need to consider the producers strategic behaviour.
If we consider the game as a simultaneous-move non-symmetric country 
game, both of the governments will prefer to act strategically where the 
producers will prefer not to act strategically.
The thesis is organised as follows: In the next chapter I explained the 
structure of the model. In the third chapter the analysis of the cases associated 
with the behaviours of the governments and producers will be analysed. In 
section 4, I discuss about the results of the game and I put my comments. In 
section 5 the non-symmetric country case is analysed. Section 5 is the 
conclusion.
CHAPTER 2 
THE MODEL
I use a two-countiy model with One producer in each of them. The 
producers are producing a polluting homogeneous good, x, which is sold to a 
third countiy. The finns are competing in the third country with their exports. 
Their revenues depend on the amount of output each of them produce and sell, 
X and y (x is the output of the domestic countiy, y is the output of the rival 
countiy). 1 denote the revenue of domestic country by R (x , y) = x (A -  x -  y ). 
(A -  X -  y) is the inverse demand function (or price in the third country) and A 
is a positive constant. It is multiplied with the demand to find the revenue. So 
their revenue increases with a decrease of the rival’s output and decreases with 
a increase of the rival’s output.
The government in each countiy determines the level of emission 
producers can make. To simplify the analysis I assumed that one unit of output 
generates one unit of emission. But the firms can abate some of the pollution 
they made. So the total emission will be output minus abatement. The 
governments determine the optimal emission level by maximizing the welfare 
. function of the countiy where welfare is total revenue minus total cost of
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production minus total cost of abatement minus total cost of pollution damage. 
The producers maximize their profit function which is equal to: total revenue 
minus total cost of production minus total cost of abatement, using the emission 
level determined by the government. The governments and producers have the 
choice of acting strategically or not. The governments act strategically by 
considering that the output of the rival fimi is affected by the choice of its own 
emission level. The producers act strategically by considering the side effects 
of their investment in R&D on the rival’s output. When they are not acting 
strategically they deteimine the R&D level by minimizing their own production 
cost plus R&D cost.
I assume that the cost of producing output x is C(x,(p) = cpx /4 where cp is 
the technology parameter (or R&D parameter). The firms decide how much to
invest in R&D by choosing the cp parameter. The cost of 9 is —, ie. better
<P
technology costs more. When the fiims are not acting strategically they
1minimize the total cost function (p—  + — for any given level of output and
4 (p
minimization of this function results in (p = -  as the optimal R&D level. So in
X
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cases where producers are not acting strategically cp will be chosen as —. 
Substituting this into the cost function gives us the total cost:
T’ . 1 , 2 1 X XTotal cost = ----- + —  = -  + — = x
X 4 2lx 2 2
1 will call this the efficient cost function.
The producers have the ability of abatement. The cost of abatement is
^2
given as —  where a is the abatement level. As assumed above one unit of
output generates one unit of emission. Hence the emission level is output, x, 
minus the abatement level, e, or e = x -  a. The pollutant causes damage to the
d c ^countiy and the cost of this damage is where d is a damage parameter. We 
assume that the environmental damage is local, not global.
There are tluee stages of the game. In the first stage, governments 
choose the emission levels. Then the films take the emission level given and 
choose their R&D level. At the final stage the producers choose their output 
level using the emission level set by the governments and the R&D level set in 
the second stage. Wlien neither the government nor the producer is acting 
stiategically, the government chooses the emission level ignoring the impact of
12
its emission level on the determination of the rival’s output level and the 
producer uses its pre-chosen R&D level which is (p = 2 / x. Wlien only the 
government acts strategically, it takes into consideration that the output of the 
rival firm is affected by the choice of its own emission level. The producer does 
not choose its R&D level specifically. Instead it uses (p = 2 / x. When only the 
producer acts strategically; the producer considers the effect of its R&D choice 
on the outputs of the rival firni by maximizing its profit function with respect to 
(p, considering x and y depending on 9 and the government ignores the effect of 
its own emission level on the output level of the rival producer.
I will consider four cases pertaining to the behaviour of governments 
and producers in each countiy. These are (1) neither the government nor the 
producer is acting strategically, (2) only the government is acting strategically, 
(3) only the producer is acting strategically, and (4) both the government and 
the producer are acting strategically. These cases are for two countries. So 
overall we can observe 16 different cases related to the behaviour of 
governments and producers in these two countries. First I will consider the 
symmetric cases, that is, the two countries are using the same strategy. Then I 
will consider the non-symmetiic cases.
13
The objective function of the producers is revenue minus production 
cost, minus abatement cost that is (for the domestic country):
7t|) = (A -  X -  y) X -  X -  0.5(x -  e)^ .
Here production cost function is taken as the efficient cost function.
Tlie objective function of the governments is producers’ surplus minus 
environmental damage that is:
Wd = ( A - x - y ) x - x  -  0.5(x -  e)  ^-  0.5de^.
The profit and welfare function of the rival firm will be:
TiR = (A -  X -  y) y -  y -  0.5(y -  e)^ .
Wr = ( A - x - y ) y - y  -  0.5(y -  e)  ^-  0.5de^.
To summarize the symbols used in equations, x and y are the outputs, e and e 
are the emission levels, cp and vp are the R&D levels of the domestic and rival 
countiy respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
1 will first study 4 symmetric cases related to the behaviour of governments 
and producers. By symmetiy I mean that both of the countiies are using the 
same stiategy. So these cases are: a- neither the goveniments nor the producers 
of both of the counties are acting strategically, b- only the governments of 
both of the count ies are acting strategically, c- only the producers of both of 
the count ies are acting stategically, d- both of the count ies’ governments and 
producers are acting stategically. First 1 will examine the symmefic cases then 
1 will examine the non-symmetic cases.
3.1 Non-strategic Equilibrium (NS versus NS)
The non-stategic equilibrium is neither the producers nor the governments 
are acting stategically. I call this non-stategic since the governments and 
producers are acting without thinking the impact their choice on the other 
county. In the second stage of the game the producers were choosing their 
R&D level but since the producers are not acting strategically they won’t 
choose their R&D level considering the rival’s behaviour. Instead they will use 
their pre-determined R&D level which leads to the efficient total cost function
15
C(x) -  X. I begin from the third stage. In the third stage the producers's 
objective is to maximize their profit:
max (A -  X -  y)x -  x -  0.5(x -  e f ( 1)
The producers take the emission level and the output of the rival as given and 
choose their output level. The first order condition for the maximization 
problem in ( 1) results in:
X = (A -  1 + e -  y) / 3 (2)
the reaction function of the domestic country. Given the symmetiy conditions, 
the rival producer has the following first order condition:
y = ( A - l + 8 - x ) / 3 (3 )
where s is the emission level of the rival country. Substituting (2) and (3) into
each other we get:
X = (2A -  2 + 3e -  s) / 8 
y = (2A -  2 + 38 - e) / 8
(4a)
(4b)
In the first stage of the game, the government takes the emission level, 8, 
and the output of the rival country, y, as given and choose e to maximize the 
welfare function:
max W(e) = (A -  x -  y)x -  x -  0.5(x -  e)  ^-  0.5de^ (5)
The first order condition is:
dx
{ A - \ -  y  + e -  3x)—  + x - e - d e  = 0 
de
16
